conspiracycoverage.com

The level of violence in Iraq has gone down. Some commentators believe that our decision to send more troops to Iraq caused the reduction in violence.¹ One of the early proponents of sending more troops into Iraq, Senator McCain, sounded triumphant in July.

“Many, many experts said that the surge would not succeed and said that I was wrong,” said McCain. “And, my friend I was right.”²

Actually, a close examination of the events of 2007 shows that John McCain was dead wrong.

Background

By late 2006, Iraq had exploded. Countless Iraqis had died from suicide bombings and death squads. The events in Iraq had a devastating effect on President Bush’s popularity. In the 2006 midterm elections, the American people handed President Bush’s party a huge defeat. Everyone agreed we needed to change course.

The previous strategy, called “clear, hold, build”, had failed. We could “clear” a small area of insurgents, but after we left the area, the insurgents would return. In order to make that strategy work, we would need to send more troops to Iraq. Unfortunately, we did not have enough troops back home to send to Iraq.

Back in March, we set up a bipartisan commission to study the war in Iraq and recommend solutions. This commission, called the Iraq Study Group (ISG), delivered its report in December.³

The report gave several recommendations. It called for diplomacy with Iraq’s neighbors - most notably Iran and Syria. Throughout 2006, Iran supplied insurgents in Iraq with weapons and training. The ISG recommended confronting Iran with our accusations and negotiating with them to make them stop their aggressive activities and to convince them to help us fix the political situation in Iraq. The political situation was in shambles. Two of Iraq’s main factions, the Sunni and the Shiites, had engaged in an all out war since February of 2006, when Sunnis attacked a Shiite shrine in Samarra. Up until that point, the Shiites had tried to stay calm and not respond to the terrorist acts of the Sunni insurgents. But their patience died after the Sunnis attacked that shrine.

The ISG argued that the Sunnis targeted the Shiites because they felt excluded from the government. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi government instituted a law banning members of his party, the Baathists, from taking part in the government. This did not make the Sunnis happy, and probably led them to strike out at the people who made this law - the Shiites.

To get the two sides to stop fighting, the ISG recommended the Iraqi government pass political reconciliation laws. In addition to allowing the Baathists back into the government, the ISG said the Iraqis needed to come up with a system for distributing the oil revenues fairly amongst the population. The government also needed to hold a new round of elections. The previous election did not result in an equitable dispersion of power because the Sunnis did not participate in that election.

As for Syria, the ISG recommended persuading Syria to close its border. Since the fall of Saddam, insurgents from other countries had entered Iraq from Syria. Furthermore, Syria needed to help convince the Baathists to enter Iraq’s political system. Syria does have leverage over the Iraqi Baathists, because the Baath party is not contained to Iraq. In fact, the President of the Baath Party is Syrian President Assad.

The ISG also recommended using U.S. forces to train Iraqis to take care of their own security, rather than doing it for them.

Not everyone liked the ISG report. Critics of the report argued for an increase in troops in Iraq, and for President Bush to replace his national security team.⁴ They argued against negotiating with Iran and Syria. Senator McCain led the charge for a ‘surge’ in troops. Move On called the surge “McCain’s idea.”⁵ John Edwards called the surge “the McCain Doctrine.”

President Bush decided to go with the McCain Doctrine. In a speech at the beginning of January, he outlined his strategy.⁶ He decided to send 20,000 more troops into Iraq. Most of the troops would be sent into Baghdad. These troops would work with Iraqi forces to secure the city. He also decided to move our troops from a few large bases to 34 Joint Security Stations located around the city in violent places.⁷ President Bush believed the surge in troops would last until the end of summer, at which point we could start to reduce the number of troops we had in Iraq.⁸ Of course, critics complained that we already had 130,000 troops in Iraq. What could a measly 20,000 more do?

The Awakening

Ironically, one of the keys to the stabilization of Iraq lied outside of Baghdad. To the west of Baghdad lies Anbar province, a predominately Sunni area inhabited by tribes and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.

Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia didn’t just kill U.S. soldiers. They killed everybody. Initially, the tribes who inhabited Anbar province sided with Al Qaeda against us. But after seeing the havoc Al Qaeda created, and after seeing that Al Qaeda would fight them for control of Anbar, the tribes decided to turn against Al Qaeda and join us. In August of 2006, fifty tribes in Anbar province formed a national party called the Awakening. It pledged to fight Al Qaeda, become part of the political system, promote a better image of the U.S., and form a legal system in Anbar.⁹

“These weren’t people who were struck by a lightning bolt or saw a burning bush and came over to this side of the Lord,” said one U.S. Colonel. “These were people who last year were being hammered from two different directions: by Al Qaeda and by us. It was probably a distasteful choice to make back then because, after all, they viewed us as invaders, and they probably still do, but it was a survival choice and they made it.”¹⁰

As part of the deal, we gave each soldier in the Awakening $300 a month. As of today, we have 80,000 Iraqis on our payrolls.¹¹

The Awakening has crushed Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which has made our government very happy.

“The emergence of the [Awakening] to help secure local communities has been one of the most significant developments in the past 18 months in Iraq,” according to the Department of Defense.¹²

“Their contributions to the country’s current stability cannot be overemphasized. Capitalizing on the gains made by the [Awakening], efforts can now focus on building capacity, revitalizing the economy, and improving the quality of life for the region’s residents,” said a U.S. press release.¹³

Even Shiite lawmakers agreed that the Awakening helped to secure Iraq.

“Before, there was a security void in their areas, but they were able to fill it,” said one senior Dawa official.¹⁴

Despite the progress, some people question the decision to partner with the Awakening.

“There are understandable concerns on the part of a government that is majority Shiite that, what they [would be] doing was hiring former Sunni insurgents, giving them a new lease on life, and that when this is all said and done they may turn against the government or the Shiite population,” said General Petraeus.¹⁵

Not only that, some fear that the Awakening will turn against us, again. They believe that the Awakening will stay on our side “as long as it is in their interests.”

To add another complication, there seems to be a power struggle going on inside the Sunnis for control of Anbar province. Right now, the Awakening does not have representation in the government. That should change after the next election. The Sunnis who hold power now seem afraid of losing their power to the Awakening.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the Awakening has brought the level of violence down in Anbar province. Not only that, they managed to reduce the amount of violence in Baghdad, without even having to fight.

Baghdad

President Bush did not completely ignore the Iraq Study Group report. He did have a plan for political reconciliation. He also had a plan to engage Iran and Syria. The efforts to engage Syria succeeded, for the most part. The efforts to engage Iran started disastrously, but improved as time progressed. Those three things - the efforts to engage Iran and Syria and the effort to bring Sunnis back into the political process resulted in the reduction in violence in Baghdad.

Iran

Initially, our engagement strategy with Iran revolved around one thing - intimidation. We started this plan in December, before the troop surge even started. Our soldiers arrested several Iranian operatives in Iraq. That did not make the Iranians happy.

“This move is against international regulations and can have unpleasant consequences,” said one Iranian official.¹⁷ That was not an idle threat.

In January, we moved more of our forces closer to Iran and we told U.S. companies to stop doing business with Iran.¹⁸ We also accused Iran of aiding insurgents in Iraq. We accused Iran of supplying bombs to Shiite militias. These weapons, called Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs), killed 170 of our soldiers.¹⁹ By going public with this information, we hoped to turn public opinion against Iran, not in the U.S., but in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.

“There’s a clear line of evidence that points out the Iranians want to punish the United States, hurt the United States in Iraq, tie down the United States in Iraq, so that our other options in the region, against other activities the Iranians might have, would be limited,” said CIA director Michael Hayden.

Our actions made everyone nervous - including the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC).  Though we publicly accuse Moktada al-Sadr of having a close relationship with Iran, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council has stronger ties to Iran than Sadr. During Saddam’s reign, the SIIC sought refuge in Iran. Furthermore, Iran trains and supplies their militia, the Badr Brigade. As a matter of fact, originally, the SIIC called themselves the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. They gave themselves that name to denote their original purpose - to bring to Iraq the same Islamic Revolution that occurred in Iran. They changed their name because after we got rid of Saddam, they announced mission accomplished and they changed their name accordingly.²⁰ Not surprisingly, they did not like our posture with Iran.

“Talks between the United States and Iran are of the utmost importance,” said the leader of SIIC.²¹

Moktada al-Sadr

“I swear to God, I’m not going to let Sadr run this country,” said Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki.²² Iraqis had a good reason to fear Sadr. His militia, the Mahdi Army, was responsible for the violence after the 2006 bombing in Samarra. They formed death squads to cleanse Iraq of its Sunni population. They eliminated the Sunni population from at least ten Baghdad neighborhoods.²³ Shiites gained control of all of east Baghdad. Though his actions made him a villain amongst Sunnis, he became a hero amongst Shiites.

“Since the Samarra bombing last year, Moktada has received a lot of pressure to be tougher on the Sunnis,” said a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. “He’s found that the tougher he’s been, the more his popularity has gone up.”²⁴

The Shiites also supported Sadr because he gave them the things the government could not. With his power, he opened offices throughout Iraq and provided services that the government should have provided, but didn’t.²⁵

We had to do something to rein in the Mahdi Army. We tried several things. Once the surge began, Iraqi forces started to arrest members of the Mahdi Army. Initially, the Mahdi Army acquiesced to the demands of the government. It appears that before the surge, we cut a deal with Sadr. For the duration of the surge, he agreed to keep his militia under control.

“Whatever the provocation, with the surge against us or anything else, we will not kidnap anyone or take revenge by ourselves,” said the mayor of Sadr City. “We will leave everything to the government.”²⁶

In exchange for the Mahdi Army’s cooperation, the government pumped $41 million into Sadr City.

But the peace between us and the Mahdi Army would not last. When we accused Iran of arming militias in Iraqi, we meant that Iran had trained and armed the Mahdi Army. Because of Iran’s close relationship with Sadr, Iran had a lot of influence over his militia. Iran would not let the Mahdi Army bow down before us. Not only did Iran have a lot of influence over Sadr, they also had a lot of influence with his underlings.

“Iran intervenes in many ways, with many methods,” said one Shiite MP. “Iran puts Moktada al-Sadr between two pressing sides. On one hand, they are helping him and they have the ability to take that away. At the same time, they’re undermining him by helping people below him.”

President Bush probably thought he bought the Mahdi Army’s compliance. The events of the next few months will show just how wrong he was.

The Sunnis

At the beginning of the surge, the political reconciliation process seemed hopeful. In January, one hundred senior Iraqi Baathists met with Syrian officials. They announced their willingness to pursue political reconciliation, instead of violence.²⁷ The Syrians also tried to convince Iran to change its behavior. In February, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran. During the meeting, President Assad professed his desire for “Muslim countries to preserve unity.”²⁸ The Syrians had a good reason to try and resolve the situation in Iraq. After the war began, many Iraqi fled Iraq into Syria. Today, over one million Iraqi refugees live in Syria. I’m sure the Syrians hope to send them home soon. Not only that, but Syria is predominately Sunni while Iran, their close ally, is predominately Shiite. A war between Sunnis and Shiites is the last thing they want to see.

Actually, a war between Sunnis and Shiites is the last thing anyone wants to see. That’s why in March several nations, including Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the United States held a summit to find ways to resolve the conflict in Iraq.

“There is greater recognition now of the dangers of the serious situation in Iraq,” said Iraq’s foreign minister. “If they don’t do more - and so far they’ve been spectators, saying ‘Let the Americans have it’ - the consequence will be Iraq’s failure. This would mean spillover, chaos, sectarianism, terrorism and drug trafficking.”²⁹

Things Get Out of Hand

Our efforts to intimidate Iran failed. In March, Iran seized 15 British soldiers.³⁰ They released them two weeks later, after we released one of the Iranians we captured at the end of 2006.³¹ As for the situation in Iraq, I believe Iran told its Shiite allies in Iraq to stop the political reconciliation process. The situation soon escalated.

Without reconciliation, the Sunnis continued to attack Shiites. They killed Shiite pilgrims as they made their pilgrimage to Karbala. The Mahdi Army said it would obey the ceasefire order. But their actions prove otherwise. In Tal Afar, after several suicide bombings against Shiites, police officers went through a Sunni area, removed Sunnis women and children from their houses, threw them into the street, and shot them.³² Although the government arrested those police officers, they only held those officers for a few hours before releasing them.³³

Political Reconciliation Fails

With the situation spiraling out of control, Secretary Gates pleaded for “faster progress” on Sunni-Shiite reconciliation.³⁴ The Iraqi government had not achieved what it had promised.

“The political track has yet to gain traction,” said a deputy prime minister from Kurdistan. “We need a grand bargain among Iraqis to establish a sustainable and balanced power sharing arrangement.”³⁵

Political reconciliation officially went into limbo when Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani announced his opposition to a proposal that would reintegrate Baath officials into the government.³⁶ The Sunnis did not like that.

“In my opinion, our country is now one led by the clerics, and the new political process in Iraq is made to allow those clerics and religious parties to govern Iraq,” said one Sunni legislator. “The Iraqis will feel the consequences of that.”

Hell on Earth

Sensing the impending disaster, the Syrians tried to cooperate with us. We asked the Syrians to reduce the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq. They did that. They hoped they would get something in return.

“We hope the Americans are serious because we in Damascus are serious about improving relations with America,” said the Syrian Foreign Minister.³⁷

Unfortunately, they didn’t do enough. The violence in Iraq continued to escalate. More civilians died now than before the surge began.

“The security situation is worsening,” said one Sadr official. “The security plan might have been declared a success in the media, but it has failed on the ground.”³⁸

Both Sadr and the leader of the SIIC went to Iran at the beginning of the surge, probably to consult with the Iranians over how to respond to the surge. They returned from Iran at roughly the same time.^{39 40} When they returned, the ceasefire with Sadr crumbled. That’s probably not a coincidence. It appears that the Iranians, Sadr, and the SIIC chose war over peace.

Their decision had a devastating effect on Iraq. U.S. and British forces fought the Mahdi Army in Baghdad and Basra.⁴¹ The body count rose 70 percent in May. Sunnis attacked a Shiite Shrine in Samarra. Shiite militias destroyed two Sunni Mosques in retaliation.⁴² We tried another round of negotiation with Iran, but nothing happened.⁴³

Our efforts to secure Baghdad fell far short of the goals we laid out at the beginning of the surge. By June, we controlled less than a third of Baghdad.⁴⁴ Our efforts to stabilize Baghdad failed because Iraqi forces failed to do their job. We did not have enough U.S. troops to hold all of Iraq. After we “cleared” an area, we needed Iraqi forces to “hold” that area. They refused to do that. They refused to intervene when insurgents restarted their activities when our forces left.

In other words, the success of the surge depended on the successful use of Iraqi forces to complement U.S. forces. The Iraqi forces failed. They did not fail because of inadequate training. They did not fail because Arabs lack the courage, the will, or the intelligence. They failed because they wanted to.

“I have a video of six Iraqi officers placing a bomb against my soldiers,” said a U.S. colonel.

Even after the surge “succeeded”, Iraqi forces still failed intentionally.

In the battle to retake Basra from the Mahdi Army, over 1000 Iraqi soldiers refused to fight.
“We don’t see any progress being made at all,” said one U.S. soldier. “We hear these guys in firefights. We know if we are not up there helping these guys out we are making very little progress.”⁴⁵

The battle for Sadr City went just as poorly.

“A gunfight broke out and we were fighting [the Mahdi Army] for about four hours,” said another U.S. soldier. “The army article made it sound like we were just there supporting the Iraqi Army, but we did all the work.”⁴⁶

In the battle for Sadr City, members of the Iraqi Army abandoned their positions. They claimed they needed better equipment to fight the strong militias equipped and trained by Iran. Here’s what they’re really saying. Iran is all-powerful. You will not be able to defeat them. Oh, and one more thing …could you please give us more weapons that we can use to kill you?

Even when they stood their ground, they managed to work against our interests. The Iraqi Army often discharged their weapons without cause.

“They are lighting up everything,” said one U.S. soldier. “Tell them to knock it off.”

“Sometimes they start shooting because they heard or saw something, but then there’s nothing there,” said another soldier.

Again, I believe the Iraqi soldiers did this intentionally. They planned on creating as much havoc and destruction as possible, believing that the Iraqi people would blame us for the destruction in Iraq.

The Shiite-led Iraqi forces had a choice to make - the United States or Iran. Of course, they chose Iran.

A Change In Strategy

By the middle of summer, the surge in troops had obviously failed. Sadr stopped participating in the government, which made the possibility of reconciliation even more remote. EFP attacks on U.S. forces hit an all time high in July.

“I think it is because the Iranians are surging support to the special groups,” said one U.S. General. “Over the last three to four months, it has picked up in terms of equipment, training and dollars.”⁴⁷

The surge in troops did not make Iraq safer. It backfired. Support for the war crumbled. Even the Republicans started to question the war.⁴⁸ Time was running out. The administration had to give Congress an assessment of the surge in September.⁴⁹ If things did not improve by then, Congress might abandon the war. We needed to change our strategy, once again. The administration gave the Iraq Study Group report another look.

“The report is not out of date,” said one member of the ISG. “We said the situation was grave and deteriorating. I think that’s still the case today. We call for a new diplomatic offensive. I think that’s still needed today.”⁵⁰ We aimed our ‘diplomatic offensive’ at Iran.

We met with Iran two times previously, but nothing came from either meeting. We decided to meet with Iran again.

“The fact is, as we made very clear at today’s talks, that over the roughly two months since our last meetings, we have actually seen militia-related activity that can be attributed to Iranian support go up, and not down,” said the U.S. Ambassador. “So I was clear as I could be with the Iranians that this effort, the discussion, has to be measured in results, not in principles or promises, and that thus far, the results on the ground are not encouraging.”⁵¹

I don’t think Ambassador Crocker convinced Iran to stop sending bombs to Iraq. I think the Sunni terrorists gave a more persuasive argument.

“We are giving the Persians, and especially the rulers of Iran, a two-month period to end all kinds of support for the Iraqi Shiite government and to stop direct and indirect intervention. Otherwise, a severe war is waiting for you,” said the lead of the Islamic State in Iraq.⁵² I don’t know if we told Islamic State in Iraq to make this message, but it wouldn’t surprise me.

Just as important, we pushed Prime Minister Maliki into action. He had failed in his efforts to pass reconciliation laws and he did nothing to convince Iran that it needed to change its behavior. Some thought Maliki was incompetent. Others saw a more sinister man. They believe he is trying to keep U.S. forces in Iraq, while doing nothing to end the political impasse.⁵³

President Bush professed his frustration with the Iraqi government. The U.S. Ambassador called the amount of political progress in Iraq “extremely disappointing.”⁵⁴ Members of Congress called on Prime Minister Maliki to resign. It looked as though we might stop funding the Iraqi government.

The Breakthrough

Apparently, our pressure on Prime Minister Maliki had an effect. At the beginning of August, Prime Minister Maliki met with Ayatollah Khamenei, asking for his help in stabilizing Iraq.⁵⁵

At the end of August, the Iraqi government came up with a reconciliation plan. It called for the release of thousands of detainees.⁵⁶ Also, the plan allowed Baath members back into the government. A couple days later, Sadr suspended military operations.⁵⁷ Iranian officials were in Baghdad to broker the deal.⁵⁸ The deal made us happy. We stopped calling for Prime Minister Maliki to resign.⁵⁹

Most likely, Iran decided to reduce the level of violence in Iraq for two reasons. They saw the escalating violence between Sunnis and Shiites and knew they needed to bring that to an end. Although Shiites outnumber Sunnis in Iraq and Iran, worldwide the numbers are dramatically different - Sunnis vastly outnumber Shiites. Iran knows it cannot start a war between Sunnis and Shiites. They would lose that war. The other reason why Iran probably decided to stop the violence in Iraq had to do with our support of the Awakening. They knew about our anger towards the Shiite-led Iraqi government. They probably thought we might dissolve the Shiite-led government and replace it with a government led by the Awakening.

In any case, the violence in Iraq dropped sharply from that point to the end of the year. In October, as the violence continued to abate, we released the Iranians we had captured at the end of last year.⁶⁰ I assume we did that to reward Iran for its role in reducing the violence in Iraq.

Throughout the final months of 2007, we continued to pressure Iran, hoping they would continue to reduce the level of violence in Iraq. Ironically, we did not pressure Iran on its support of Shiite militias. We pressured Iran on its nuclear program.

The Nuclear Issue

We accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons and threatened a stiffer set of economic sanctions. Up until now, the sanctions we imposed were geared towards getting Iran’s attention, as opposed to actually hurting the regime. The stiffer sanctions would come from Europe. They considered cutting Iran off from their banks and restricting technology transfers.⁶¹

We probably decided to pursue Iran based on its nuclear program, as opposed to its support of insurgents in Iraq, because we had better evidence of its nuclear program and because we would have an easier time convincing other nations to help us. After all, the EFP issue only concerned us and Iraq. On the other hand, no one wanted Iran to get nuclear weapons.

We knew a lot about Iran’s nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) knew about Iran’s nuclear facility in Natanz, which housed 2000 centrifuges. Those centrifuges enrich uranium. After enrichment, the uranium could fuel a nuclear reactor, or a nuclear bomb.

Apparently, Iran did not want to get in a fight over its nuclear program — it had its centrifuges operating at 10 percent of their potential.

“They could have expanded much faster,” said one official. “Some say it’s for technical reasons. My gut feeling is that it’s primarily for political reasons.”⁶²

In other words, the Iranians knew that running their uranium enrichment operation at full speed would lead to economic sanctions.

By the middle of November, we knew that Iran had helped stop the violence in Iraq. This put us in a precarious position. We still wanted to stop Iran’s nuclear program, but we could not apply significant sanctions for fear of the retaliation we would receive in Iraq.

The will to use sanctions had grown. In November, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China agreed to pursue a new round of sanctions against Iran.

This made the Iraqi government nervous. They wanted peace. They publicly thanked Iran for persuading the militias to halt their operations. They also thanked Iran for reducing the number of weapons entering Iraq. Even our military acknowledged Iran’s cooperation in reducing the violence.

When asked for a reason why Iran reduced the level of violence in Iraq, the Iraqi government cited the August meeting between Prime Minister Maliki and Ayatollah Khamenei as the critical turning point.

“Iran had to choose whether to support the government or any other party, and Iraq will decide according to which they chose,” said an Iraqi government spokesperson.

At the end of November, a last-ditch effort to convince Iran to give up its nuclear program failed. After negotiations broke down, we met with Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany. They wanted to proceed with a new round of sanctions.⁶³ Well, shit. We didn’t want that. We wanted everyone to calm down. Time for plan B. We created and released a new document that would stop the sanctions process.

We released a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program. According to this document, Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003.⁶⁴ The previous NIE, issued in 2005, argued that Iran had vigorously pursued nuclear weapons. The new NIE directly contradicted the old report. The new NIE did the trick. We didn’t have to worry about sanctions against Iran.

“Officially, we will study the document carefully; unofficially, our efforts to build up momentum for another resolution are gone,” said one European official.⁶⁵

Of course, the new NIE left everyone scratching their heads.

“We’re all flabbergasted,” said another European diplomat.

For one thing, the report made no mention of the documents obtained from an Iranian computer that showed Iran had worked on a nuclear warhead. The new NIE did not mention those documents at all - it neither validated nor invalidated that data. It simply ignored it.⁶⁶

The IAEA was shocked. In the past, we pressured them to take a tougher stance against Iran. Now the shoe was on the other foot. Apparently, the IAEA was more suspicious of Iran than we were.

“To be frank, we are more skeptical,” said one IAEA official. “We don’t buy the American analysis 100 percent. We are not that generous with Iran.”⁶⁷

Others wondered how our position could change so quickly and drastically. In October, Bush thought a nuclear Iran would lead to World War III. A month later, he claims Iran stopped its nuclear program in 2003. Didn’t he know about the new information back in October? He claims he only received the new information a week before the government issued the new NIE.

“That’s not believable,” said Senator Biden. “I refuse to believe that. If that’s true, he has the most incompetent staff in modern American history and he’s one of the most incompetent presidents in modern American history.”⁶⁸

So on what basis did the report conclude that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program? The report concluded that Iran had stopped its nuclear program because it “defines ‘nuclear weapons program’ in a ludicrously narrow way: it confines it to enriching uranium at secret sites or working on a nuclear weapon design.”⁶⁹

Of course, the report’s definition is silly. An expert on nuclear weapons once said that a political scientist could design a uranium-based fission weapon.⁷⁰ The hard part of creating a nuclear weapon is getting the nuclear fuel. For that part, the report only considered enriching uranium in secret locations. The report ignored Iran’s facility in Natanz, which isn’t secret, but is enriching uranium.

The report had an immediate effect. Shortly after we issued the report, China and Russia pursued new economic opportunities with Iran. A Chinese company signed a $2 billion deal to develop an oil field in Iran and Russia delivered uranium fuel-rods to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear facility. ^{71 72}

Conclusions

The events of 2007 disprove the premise behind the surge. The administration told us that the surge would create the safety needed for political reconciliation. The exact opposite occurred. The surge exploded Iraq and threatened to explode the entire Middle East in sectarian violence. Those conditions of chaos scared everyone into negotiating with each other.

The surge showed the folly of not negotiating with our enemies. During the surge, we negotiated with all of our enemies. That’s what caused the reduction in violence. We negotiated with the Awakening and got them to turn against Al Qaeda. We forced the Iraqi government into negotiations with the party of Saddam Hussein, the Baathists. We negotiated with Syria, and got them to reduce the number of insurgents entering Iraq. We negotiated with Iran, and got them to reduce the number of EFPs entering Iraq.

I hope this article shows that the violence in Iraq is not random. From the initial invasion to the present day, our government, along with the governments of Iran and Syria, the former government of Iraq, the Baathists, and the tribes who inhabit Anbar province have decided to violently pursue their political goals. Not only does the surge prove this, but the events after the fall of Saddam prove this. The media would like you to believe that after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq had a bunch of Arabs walking around with no money and no jobs, so naturally, they took to killing one another. Documents found recently disprove this theory.

Those documents show that Iraqis controlled Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.⁷³ Foreigners sat low on the totem pole. Al Qaeda used them for suicide bombings. The documents show a force bureaucratically organized similar to Saddam Hussein’s regime. That’s probably not a coincidence.

In 2005, Al Qaeda’s leadership planned a three month attack on U.S. forces using suicide bombings, rockets, and infantry. Al Qaeda planned on hitting our supply lines, bridges, and helicopters in an effort to isolate our forces. As part of the plan, Al Qaeda tried to infiltrate U.S. bases to decide which bases to target. They had a training plan, extraction routes, and their plan described which weapons they needed to attack which targets. Al Qaeda used After Action Reports and Battle Damage Assessments just like our military does.

“[The documents] reveal, first of all, a pretty robust command and control system,” said one U.S. Admiral. “I was kind of surprised when I saw the degree of documentation for everything - pay records, those kinds of things - and that [al Qaeda in Iraq] was obviously a well-established network.”

In short, the documents show a well organized effort to reinstall the Baathist regime in Iraq.

Pawns

Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the media maintains that the surge in troops led to the reduction in violence. Of course, President Bush and Senator McCain cling to this idea. That leads me to wonder, was the troop surge just a political ploy? The original plan called for a truce with the Mahdi Army and had a plan for political reconciliation. The Bush Administration knew the value of negotiations. So why the additional troops? Were the additional troops simply a ruse — a way to give Senator McCain an advantage in the 2008 election? Before the surge, we had 132,000 troops in Iraq. The surge called for an additional 20,000 troops - 152,000 in total. We reached that level in June of 2007 - about when we gave the Iraq Study Group report another look - about the time that we realized that our initial plan to isolate Iran had failed. Nevertheless, we continued to send more troops to Iraq - until August, when everyone cut a deal with everyone else. We immediately started reducing the number of troops in Iraq. We didn’t even wait to see if the deal would work. Did the Bush Administration simply decide to keep sending troops to Iraq until we reached a deal, at which point we could draw down and say that the troop surge caused the reduction in violence? Are our troops nothing more than pawns to our government?

1. The Bush Paradox by David Brooks 6/24/08
2. Progress in Iraq reshapes debate over war by Ken Dilanian 2/18/08
3. The Iraq Study Group Report 12/6/06
4. Experts Advise Bush Not to Reduce Troops by Michael A. Fletcher et al. 12/12/06
5. ‘Move On’ Takes Aim at McCain’s Iraq Stance by Greg Giroux 1/17/07
6. The New Way Forward in Iraq by President Bush 1/10/07
7. Inside The Surge by Jon Lee Anderson 11/19/07
8. General Sees Summer Deadline for Troops by David S. Cloud 1/20/07
9. Tribal chiefs forming anti-insurgent party by Chris Kraul 4/20/07
10. In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict by Alissa J. Rubin et al. 12/23/07
11. The Myth of the Surge by Nir Rosen 3/6/08
12. The rise and fall of a Sons of Iraq warrior by Ned Parker 6/29/08
13. U.S.-backed Sons of Iraq militia poses problem by Anna Badkhen 6/2/08
14. In Iraq’s successes, the seeds of vulnerability by Stephen Farrell et al. 6/20/08
15. U.S. Unsure About the Future of Iraq’s ‘Sons’ by Walter Pincus 3/31/08
16. Rise of Awakening Groups Sets Off A Struggle for Power Among Sunnis by Sudarsan Raghavan 7/4/08
17. Tehran Assails U.S. Arrests of Iranians in Iraq Raids by Nazila Fathi 12/26/06
18. Opening a New Front in the War, Against Iranians in Iraq by David Sanger 1/15/07
19. U.S. Says Arms Link Iranians to Iraqi Shiites by James Glanz 2/12/07
20. Changes by Iraqi Shiite Party Signal Distancing From Iran by Damien Cave et al. 5/13/07
21. Iraqi Shiite Calls for U.S.-Iran Talks by Nazila Fathi 2/6/07
22. Troop Surge Already Under Way by Jonathan Karl 1/10/07
23. Iraqis Announce New Crackdown Across Baghdad by Marc Santora 2/14/07
24. Iraq Rebel Cleric Reins In Militia; Motives at Issue by Damien Cave 2/25/07
25. Cleric Switches Tactics to Meet Changes in Iraq by Alissa Rubin 7/18/07
26. Shiite District, Flash Point in Baghdad, Rebuilds by Damien Cave 2/9/07
27. Could Syria Hold New Solution To Iraq by CBS 1/30/07
28. Syrian Leader Visits Tehran And Discusses Unrest in Area by The New York Times 2/18/07
29. Neighbors and Others Arrive in Iraq Seeking Peace by Alissa Rubin 3/10/07
30. Iran Sets Free 15 Britons Seized at Sea by Sarah Lyall 4/5/07
31. Captors Release Kidnapped Iranian Diplomat in Baghdad by Alissa Rubin 4/4/07
32. 70 Killed in Wave of Revenge in Northern Iraq by Alissa Rubin 3/29/07
33. More Than 100 Are Killed in Iraq as a Wave of Sectarian Attacks Shows No Sign of Letting Up by Kirk Semple 3/30/07
34. Gates Urges Iraq to Hasten Push to Defuse Sectarianism by David Cloud 4/19/07
35. Gates Presses Iraq Premier on Healing Sectarian Divide by David Cloud et al. 4/20/07
36. Shiite Cleric Opposes U.S. Plan to Permit Former Baath Party Members to Join Government by Edward Wong 4/3/07
37. U.S. and Syria Discuss Iraq in Rare Meeting by Helene Cooper et al. 5/4/07
38. Wave of Bombing Continues in Iraq by Kirk Semple 4/19/07
39. Iraqi Shiite Cleric Reportedly Ends a Sojourn in Iran by Michael Gordon 5/25/07
40. Number of Unidentified Bodies Found in Baghdad Rose Sharply in May by Richard Oppel Jr. 6/2/07
41. U.S. and British Airstrikes hit Iraqi Militia by Kirk Semple 5/27/07
42. Despite Calls for Restraint, Sunni Mosque Is Bombed in Southern Iraq City by Damien Cave 6/17/07
43. U.S. and Iranian Officials Meet in Baghdad, but Talks Yield No Breakthroughs by Kirk Semple 5/29/07
44. Commanders Say Push in Baghdad Is Short of Goal by David Cloud et al. 6/4/07
45. Iraqi Unit Flees Post, Despite American’s Plea by Michael Gordon 4/16/08
46. Iraqi Troops: Asleep on the Job by Abigail Hauslohner 4/21/08
47. U.S. Says Iran-Supplied Bomb Kills More Troops by Michael Gordon 8/8/07
48. In White House, Debate Is Rising On Iraq Pullback by David Sanger 7/9/07
49. White House and Military Say Iraq Report Will Be Ready in September by Thom Shanker et al. 7/21/07
50. Senators Dust Off Iraq Study Group Report by David Herszenhorn 7/15/07
51. U.S. and Iran Trade Blame in Second Round of Iraq Talks by Stephen Farrell 7/25/07
52. Around 150, Death Toll in Iraq Attack Among War’s Worst by Stephen Farrell 7/9/07
53. Bush and Iraqi: Frequent Talks, Limited Results by Jim Rutenberg et al. 7/25/07
54. Bush Takes a Step Away From Maliki by Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al. 8/22/07
55. Iraq Credits Iran for Helping to Curb Attacks by Militias by Alissa Rubin 11/18/07
56. Iraqi Leaders Reach Accord On Prisoners, Ex-Baathists by Megan Greenwall 8/27/07
57. Sadr Suspends His Militia’s Military Operations by Stephen Farrell 8/30/07
58. Iranians Seized in Baghdad Freed by U.S. After a Day by Stephen Farrell 8/30/07
59. Maliki Gains Time, but Faces a Daunting Task by Alissa Rubin 9/25/07
60. U.S. Releases 9 Iranians in Iraq by Cara Buckley 10/10/07
61. Washington Sees an Opoprtunity on Iran by David Sanger et al. 9/27/07
62. Report Showing Rise in Iran’s Nuclear Activity Exposes Split Between U.S. and U.N. by Elaine Sciolino et al. 8/31/07
63. As Talks With Europe End, Iran Gives No Sign of Concession on Nuclear Program by John Burns 12/1/07
64. With New Data, U.S. Revises Its View of Iran by Mark Mazzetti 12/5/07
65. Europeans See Murkier Case for Sanctions by Elaine Sciolino 12/4/07
66. How Did a 2005 Estimate Go Awry? by William Broad et al. 12/4/07
67. Monitoring Agency Praises U.S. Report, but Keeps Wary Eye on Iran by Elaine Sciolino 12/5/07
68. Bush Insists Iran Remains a Threat Despite Arms Data by Steven Lee Myers et al. 12/5/07
69. In Iran We Trust? by Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin 12/6/07
70. Rogue States and Weapons of Mass Destruction by Robert Gallucci 2/11/02
71. China: An Oil Deal With Iran by Bloomberg News 12/11/07
72. Iran Receives Nuclear Fuel in Blow to U.S. by Helene Cooper 12/18/07
73. Papers give peek inside al Qaeda in Iraq by Michael Ware 6/11/08

This entry was posted on Friday, July 18th, 2008 at 4:55 pm and is filed under Uncategorized. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.